1
00:00:00,170 --> 00:00:07,049
So let's get underway. The first speaker
is Sean Wilson, who is Associate

2
00:00:07,049 --> 00:00:13,740
Professor of Political Science. he
teaches courses in Public Law, Judicial

3
00:00:13,740 --> 00:00:20,640
and American Politics, in Ludwig
Wittgenstein. His first book, "The Flexible

4
00:00:20,640 --> 00:00:27,570
Constitution" was published in 2013. His
second book, "New Critical Thinking is

5
00:00:27,570 --> 00:00:33,570
Forthcoming." His talk is titled "The
Problem of Alternate Reality and

6
00:00:33,570 --> 00:00:41,809
Politics and How Wittgenstein Got There
First." A very timely topic. Sean. Okay it's

7
00:00:41,809 --> 00:00:46,860
really difficult I think to do Wittgenstein in politics in 10 minutes. My

8
00:00:46,860 --> 00:00:50,100
head will be a little bit like the
Olympics, but what I'm going to do is

9
00:00:50,100 --> 00:00:55,230
talk about a portion of a book that I
have completed and that I'm shopping to

10
00:00:55,230 --> 00:01:01,260
a publisher. The book is called "New
Critical Thinking, What Wittgenstein Offered." and the

11
00:01:01,260 --> 00:01:05,400
piece that I'm going to talk about today
is something called picturing. What is

12
00:01:05,400 --> 00:01:09,659
picturing? And by the way when I
use the word picturing, I'm referring to

13
00:01:09,659 --> 00:01:14,010
something in Wittgenstein's book about.
What picturing is, is it's a cognitive

14
00:01:14,010 --> 00:01:19,979
phenomena. It's actually something that
the brain does. For example, suppose I

15
00:01:19,979 --> 00:01:24,299
were to say to you I want to say "don't
think of an elephant" What happens is

16
00:01:24,299 --> 00:01:28,590
when you hear this command, your mind
usually pictures an elephant, you see

17
00:01:28,590 --> 00:01:35,130
you see an elephant. And Lackoff
has an explanation for why this is

18
00:01:35,130 --> 00:01:41,310
so. I'll read it to you here. He says

"because most people don't have any

19
00:01:41,310 --> 00:01:45,600
actual relationship with elephants, as
they do for example, with dogs, people with

20
00:01:45,600 --> 00:01:50,430
lesions in visual regions of the parietal
cortex, we lose the ability to recognize

21
00:01:50,430 --> 00:01:55,470
an elephant since visual imagery is part
of the meaning." Which is basically saying

22
00:01:55,470 --> 00:02:00,420
is that you know with other animals like
dogs, you have this to relationship but

23
00:02:00,420 --> 00:02:04,170
most people don't have any relationship
with elephants. They sort of think of

24
00:02:04,170 --> 00:02:09,799

them sort of in the way that you might
have unicorn. Now

25
00:02:10,150 --> 00:02:14,450
picturing is an interesting idea. There's
lots of things that your brain can see.

26
00:02:14,450 --> 00:02:19,459
You can see for example, an image, it
might be able to picture a scenario, for

27
00:02:19,459 --> 00:02:24,590
example if you're reading a newspaper,
you imagine things, your mind fills

28
00:02:24,590 --> 00:02:30,590
in the gap. You also kinda see a metaphor,
or a framework, and this is very very

29
00:02:30,590 --> 00:02:35,920
important. An example might be Ben
Franklin. He was studying electricity and

30

00:02:35,920 --> 00:02:41,690
he began to see it with this concept
of being a current, no one had really

31
00:02:41,690 --> 00:02:47,480
talked about prior to Ben Franklin you'd only hear this idea of a current in

32
00:02:47,480 --> 00:02:52,850
water, it had a water grammar, you know?
Water has current. Ben Franklin,

33
00:02:52,850 --> 00:02:57,410
studying electricity says you know, he
described this in terms of currents, so

34
00:02:57,410 --> 00:03:03,500
this is a metaphor or a framework and it
also is an example of picturing, that

35
00:03:03,500 --> 00:03:10,790
goes on in the brain. Wittgenstein was
probably autistic and he had this

36

00:03:10,790 --> 00:03:15,410
pictorial capacity that was very
aggressive, and he talked about it often

37
00:03:15,410 --> 00:03:20,750
in his writings. He says "I just
took some apples out of a paper bag

38
00:03:20,750 --> 00:03:26,180
where they had been lying for a long
time I had to cut half off many of them

39
00:03:26,180 --> 00:03:30,079
and throw them away. Afterwards when I
was copying out a sentence I had

40
00:03:30,079 --> 00:03:34,220
written, the second half of which was bad,
I had once thought as a half-rotten

41
00:03:34,220 --> 00:03:38,870
apple. And that's how everything is with
me. Everything that comes my way becomes a

42
00:03:38,870 --> 00:03:42,380
picture for me of what I am thinking
about at the time. Is there something

43
00:03:42,380 --> 00:03:47,000
feminine about this way of thinking?" He
was constantly bombarded with mental

44
00:03:47,000 --> 00:03:52,790
pictures of one kind or another and as a
result in his philosophy he wanted to

45
00:03:52,790 --> 00:03:58,280
make sense of what this picturing is all
about. What role does it play in an

46
00:03:58,280 --> 00:04:05,239
assertion, and basically he comes up with
two ideas. He says on one hand picturing

47
00:04:05,239 --> 00:04:10,640
can really be helpful, but in
another way, it can be manipulative, and

48
00:04:10,640 --> 00:04:16,160
let me give you an example of how it can
be helpful. He talks about the Commutative

49
00:04:16,160 --> 00:04:23,600
Law of Multiplication and he says
"What this is, is informal learning it's

50
00:04:23,600 --> 00:04:32,470
simply a multiplied by b equals b multiplied by a so 5 times 4 is 4 times 5. In his mind

51
00:04:32,470 --> 00:04:38,660
when he was thinking about this he says
"look, all this is doing is flipping rows

52
00:04:38,660 --> 00:04:45,170
for columns" not so of it is actually
doing and if when learning this formula

53
00:04:45,170 --> 00:04:50,570
you could see that that's all it was
doing, flipping rows for columns, then he

54
00:04:50,570 --> 00:04:55,430
called them "scene connections" that there
was something about this picture that

55
00:04:55,430 --> 00:04:59,260
would pop in the mind that would
actually aid very much in comprehension.

56
00:04:59,260 --> 00:05:07,150
But there's another example where this
can be actually very bad and he says

57
00:05:07,150 --> 00:05:13,010
"let's say you would imagine that there
was a cord stretched around the equator

58
00:05:13,010 --> 00:05:17,390
imagine the earth and you're going to
stretch a cord around the equator and

59
00:05:17,390 --> 00:05:23,300
it's going to be very very very tight." He

says, "How much above the earth would the

60
00:05:23,300 --> 00:05:28,370
cord become if you increase the length
by only one yard but kept it tout and

61
00:05:28,370 --> 00:05:32,750
circular?" So your brain might picture a
yard as being not that much you know

62
00:05:32,750 --> 00:05:40,820
it's in football, fourth and one, no not
that much and so the common answer is to

63
00:05:40,820 --> 00:05:46,940
say "well it's you know,
insignificant" but in truth the actual

64
00:05:46,940 --> 00:05:52,610
distance is the cord would become nearly
six inches off the ground and so this is

65
00:05:52,610 --> 00:05:59,150

an example he says where you've been
misled by a picture. A picture came into

66
00:05:59,150 --> 00:06:03,430
your mind and it completely misled you.
Alright, so there's this interesting

67
00:06:03,430 --> 00:06:08,900
dynamic that you have with picturing.
Sometimes it's really helpful in an aim

68
00:06:08,900 --> 00:06:15,140
to comprehension and other times it
throws you into the wrong track. Okay and

69
00:06:15,140 --> 00:06:21,650
so now what we want to do is apply this
to politics. All of that ideology really

70
00:06:21,650 --> 00:06:29,889
is in politics is an effort by others,
other people to dominate

71

00:06:29,889 --> 00:06:35,499
what picture emerges in your mind in a
social context. That is actually all the

72
00:06:35,499 --> 00:06:40,740
ideology is it's trying to force a
picture onto a social onto a situation.

73
00:06:40,740 --> 00:06:48,069
My field presently doesn't understand
this. My field sees ideology as something

74
00:06:48,069 --> 00:06:52,719
else. It sees it for example as a
starting point in the discussion, a set

75
00:06:52,719 --> 00:06:56,620
of values. I get to have my points and you get to have your points you know. This is

76
00:06:56,620 --> 00:07:05,319
just their values. But in point of fact
what really happens is all the ideology

77

00:07:05,319 --> 00:07:16,810
is it's a cognitive and neurological
phenomena. It's an effort to take in a social context, try to manipulate you
to see the picture that I want, I see and

78
00:07:16,810 --> 00:07:21,909
that I want validated in that context,
and a good example might be for example

79
00:07:21,909 --> 00:07:28,990
abortion. You know suppose I say to you
two things I say to you I'm pro-life. Well

80
00:07:28,990 --> 00:07:33,159
I could also save you I could say hey
I'm pro-embryo. What is it that comes

81
00:07:33,159 --> 00:07:38,319
before your mind in each of these
phrases? Now some of you don't

82
00:07:38,319 --> 00:07:42,159
don't like this issue so you're already
guarded against it but let's take

83
00:07:42,159 --> 00:07:45,580
someone who doesn't know much about it
and someone is neutral about it if we

84
00:07:45,580 --> 00:07:50,500
could find such a thing. If you
spoke to a person and said you were

85
00:07:50,500 --> 00:07:54,939
pro-life it's very different what might
come to mind then saying you're pro

86
00:07:54,939 --> 00:08:01,270
embryo. This is what an the embryo would
look like after four weeks. It's about the

87
00:08:01,270 --> 00:08:06,669
size of a poppy seed and so if we had a
discussion, we could have a discussion we

88
00:08:06,669 --> 00:08:10,419
could have a discussion, about what the

value of that should be. We could have

89
00:08:10,419 --> 00:08:14,349
that, but that's not really the
discussion we have it kind of gets side

90
00:08:14,349 --> 00:08:19,779
stepped because it's a battle to try to put
certain other kinds of imagery before

91
00:08:19,779 --> 00:08:26,500
your other kinds of pictures in your
mind, right? Now there's a philosopher by the

92
00:08:26,500 --> 00:08:35,229
name of James Garvey, who I went to high
school with, and he has a book out and in

93
00:08:35,229 --> 00:08:40,820
the book he makes an interesting
claim. He's talking about how

94
00:08:40,820 --> 00:08:47,900

crime gets pictured. Now if you
describe crime as a wild beast, people

95
00:08:47,900 --> 00:08:53,060
think well, we need more policing to
control the beast, but if you describe

96
00:08:53,060 --> 00:08:57,740
crime as being something else like a
plague or a disease people think more

97
00:08:57,740 --> 00:09:02,270
well we need to cure and fix it and
heal it, and so whatever picture you put there

98
00:09:02,270 --> 00:09:08,060
or what metaphor you put
there for that issue is suggestive for

99
00:09:08,060 --> 00:09:12,170
what people then will get pushed as to
what the solution should be. Let's listen

100

00:09:12,170 --> 00:09:17,030
to James. So that story was
told the two separate groups of people

101
00:09:17,030 --> 00:09:22,750
one heard the story about crime being
described as a beast lurking in the city.

102
00:09:22,750 --> 00:09:28,760
Seventy-five percent of them thought
about policing, incarceration, sending in

103
00:09:28,760 --> 00:09:34,400
the army, just twenty five percent
thought about social reform, creating

104
00:09:34,400 --> 00:09:38,270
education opportunities for people in
the city. If you heard a different

105
00:09:38,270 --> 00:09:41,150
version another group pretty different
version that story where crime was

106
00:09:41,150 --> 00:09:45,860
described as a plague virus infecting
the city. The number of people who

107
00:09:45,860 --> 00:09:49,520
thought about social reform nearly
doubled to forty four percent. There's a

108
00:09:49,520 --> 00:09:54,020
corresponding drop in the number of
people who thought about policing, right?

109
00:09:54,020 --> 00:09:57,320
So this is this is framing this is a
framing effect. We don't really

110
00:09:57,320 --> 00:10:01,730
understand how framing works. It's
thought the authors of this study think

111
00:10:01,730 --> 00:10:05,690
that it's when you hear a certain
metaphor, hear a certain word that

112
00:10:05,690 --> 00:10:10,570
emphasizes some aspects of concept and
not others. So your brain will think of

113
00:10:10,570 --> 00:10:14,150
obstructing inconsistent inferences when
you hear about a beast you think about

114
00:10:14,150 --> 00:10:22,220
guns and cages. We have a virus you think
about healing the whole thing. This is

115
00:10:22,220 --> 00:10:26,360
unfortunately this is the real power of
spin, this works on us. What is the

116
00:10:26,360 --> 00:10:32,330
solution to this? In three minutes I'm
going to give a solution but first I

117
00:10:32,330 --> 00:10:37,040
want to hear Garvey's solution and

my conclusion here think Garvey's wrong

118
00:10:37,040 --> 00:10:43,400
but let's listen to a solution. So
this is how spin works, it works and it's

119
00:10:43,400 --> 00:10:47,000
really easy to scale up and change the
opinions of a lot of people just by how

120
00:10:47,000 --> 00:10:51,450
you put language. And this is happening I
think at the

121
00:10:51,450 --> 00:10:55,530
expense of things like reasons and
arguments and careful carefully made

122
00:10:55,530 --> 00:11:01,530
points. If you can think critically and
carefully, wouldn't you undermine things

123
00:11:01,530 --> 00:11:04,650

like that rather than support them and
go along with them? And you have to

124
00:11:04,650 --> 00:11:09,720
wonder, I have to wonder, if some of this
shift and persuasion is partly what's

125
00:11:09,720 --> 00:11:14,640
going on in the states with the rise of
Donald Trump. Is this kind of what's

126
00:11:14,640 --> 00:11:18,270
going on with brexit? There were no
good arguments, there were no good

127
00:11:18,270 --> 00:11:24,810
debates. It was appeals to emotion, appeals
to Authority, outright lies and is this

128
00:11:24,810 --> 00:11:29,690
shift to post-truth politics part of
this change in persuasion? All right, now

129

00:11:29,690 --> 00:11:34,620
here's the way a Wittgensteinian would
look at this: Garvey's solution actually

130
00:11:34,620 --> 00:11:42,780
is not correct. It is not true that the
problem is that the information is false

131
00:11:42,780 --> 00:11:48,750
and it's not true that the metaphor is
tricking you and you have to therefore

132
00:11:48,750 --> 00:11:54,710
put it to the side because presumably if
Garvey has a solution to crime it too

133
00:11:54,710 --> 00:12:00,990
involves a picture. You can't escape the
picture, all right? What happened in the

134
00:12:00,990 --> 00:12:07,170
study with crime is perfectly natural. This is in fact a natural mode of

135

00:12:07,170 --> 00:12:14,250
understanding. George Lackoff says
"pictures structure the whole system of

136
00:12:14,250 --> 00:12:17,310
thought though they rarely show up in the
language of the discourse they are

137
00:12:17,310 --> 00:12:22,140
structuring. Where they show up is in the
forms of reason used in the coherence of

138
00:12:22,140 --> 00:12:26,360
apparently disparate ideas if you strip
away the picture it's not clear how you

139
00:12:26,360 --> 00:12:33,090
could think about communication or what
communication is." The real problem that

140
00:12:33,090 --> 00:12:39,900
we have today isn't that there's
misinformation. The real problem that I

141
00:12:39,900 --> 00:12:46,460
believe we have today is that as a
society, we are reaching a point where

142
00:12:46,460 --> 00:12:53,490
whatever picture you want to exist for
something, there's a market photo, and you

143
00:12:53,490 --> 00:13:00,780
can live in this bubble and have only
that picture there and that we as a

144
00:13:00,780 --> 00:13:07,109
people are now becoming intolerant on both the left and the right

145
00:13:07,109 --> 00:13:13,239
whenever someone comes along and tries
to show another picture. We don't want to

146
00:13:13,239 --> 00:13:20,379
be consumers of pictures we don't like,
and this is actually what's happening. It's

147
00:13:20,379 --> 00:13:27,459
not that there's false information out
there, it's that what is out there, there are

148
00:13:27,459 --> 00:13:33,160
now markets out there to feed only one
way of seeing something, and we get kind

149
00:13:33,160 --> 00:13:38,410
of upset when we're forced to look at
something, conceptualize it, think about

150
00:13:38,410 --> 00:13:42,759
it in a way that we don't want to and
it's a social phenomena and this is

151
00:13:42,759 --> 00:13:50,439
what I think is happening, all right? The
solution to this is threefold. What you

152
00:13:50,439 --> 00:13:56,739
want to do is number one show people
that picturing as a phenomenon occurs in

153
00:13:56,739 --> 00:14:01,959
the brain whether it's religion or
politics or what have you, there's some

154
00:14:01,959 --> 00:14:08,649
framework some scenario in their mind
that they've invested in and you will

155
00:14:08,649 --> 00:14:13,929
to show them that this in fact happens
as a phenomenon and the other thing you

156
00:14:13,929 --> 00:14:19,329
want to do is try to capacitate the
pictorial imagination, so that when

157
00:14:19,329 --> 00:14:25,059
someone decides what the views are on
something that they're able to indulge

158
00:14:25,059 --> 00:14:29,919
other ways of seeing it and it's not

simply other arguments or other facts

159
00:14:29,919 --> 00:14:34,239
its other two ways of seeing it to see
it the way someone else sees it when

160
00:14:34,239 --> 00:14:38,589
they see it in their mind, all right you
have to you have to become well-rounded

161
00:14:38,589 --> 00:14:46,689
and this gets to the last topic therapy,
part of what Wittgensteinian's believe

162
00:14:46,689 --> 00:14:50,589
is that the role of philosophy is
actually just to do simply this: mess

163
00:14:50,589 --> 00:14:56,649
with the pictures in people's head. Wittgenstein would come into the class and often

164
00:14:56,649 --> 00:15:01,419
imagine for scientific facts and have his

students do that because part of what

165
00:15:01,419 --> 00:15:07,389
we're supposed to do is force these
pictures, force people to see different

166
00:15:07,389 --> 00:15:11,799
ways of seeing things because only then
could they become better consumers for

167
00:15:11,799 --> 00:15:14,650
what
frameworks that they want to choose from.

168
00:15:14,650 --> 00:15:28,310
Anyway that's what I have for you today.
Thank you very much. So on all your

169
00:15:28,310 --> 00:15:34,190
announces are all pictures of people or
some pictures more representative than

170
00:15:34,190 --> 00:15:41,030

others? And if so, which ones? Yeah I didn't have time to get
the quote from Wittgenstein. There's

171
00:15:41,030 --> 00:15:47,380
absolutely no question that pictures are
not equal okay and there was a time in

172
00:15:47,380 --> 00:15:53,240
the social configuration of life, the
form of life when for example a flat

173
00:15:53,240 --> 00:15:58,150
earth picture fit better than the
picture we have of the earth now and

174
00:15:58,150 --> 00:16:05,210
there's no question that some pictures
are better than it is and which ones

175
00:16:05,210 --> 00:16:10,490
actually fit better is I think something
that would belong to aesthetics

176

00:16:10,490 --> 00:16:14,720
connoisseur judgment Wittgensteinian's approach aesthetics the way

177
00:16:15,880 --> 00:16:22,010
analytic philosophers do morality with
basic foundations in aesthetics some

178
00:16:22,010 --> 00:16:26,180
choices are better than others. So I
consider myself a post analytic thinker

179
00:16:26,180 --> 00:16:32,500
not a post modern thinker. I'm not a
skeptic, I don't think all choices are equal. Go Ahead.

180
00:16:36,610 --> 00:16:42,490
Well I mean I think it's probably a
probably good question. Wittgenstein

181
00:16:42,490 --> 00:16:49,130
wanted would ask his students to
imagine false scientific facts, not say

182

00:16:49,130 --> 00:16:53,480
that they were false. He wanted them to
see if they have the capacity to imagine

183
00:16:53,480 --> 00:16:59,420
concepts as they existed if certain
facts weren't true and so what this was

184
00:16:59,420 --> 00:17:04,339
for was to encourage the way that they
would conceive and think of things

185
00:17:04,339 --> 00:17:09,829
because he wanted to show show them that
what they currently think is only a way

186
00:17:09,829 --> 00:17:14,209
of thinking an orchestration of social
construction in some way and you can

187
00:17:14,209 --> 00:17:18,230
give a gift of sort of God's eye view
where you can see yourself in this

188
00:17:18,230 --> 00:17:23,610
construction then you presumably
would know better it's also

189
00:17:23,610 --> 00:17:28,650
unsettling because it mean it means that
foundations become something a little

190
00:17:28,650 --> 00:17:35,610
different. So it's negative in one sense
but it is trying to get a God's eye

191
00:17:35,610 --> 00:17:39,900
perspective on where your beliefs come
from so it's meant to be it's meant to

192
00:17:39,900 --> 00:17:45,180
be used instrumentally to make someone
think better. Sean, getting back to what novel is

193
00:17:45,180 --> 00:17:48,900
saying about different pictures and
whether they're equal or not in your

194
00:17:48,900 --> 00:17:53,730
answer, from a psychological viewpoint though wouldn't there be certain pictures that

195
00:17:53,730 --> 00:17:58,410
would elicit stronger emotional
responses and therefore opinions in

196
00:17:58,410 --> 00:18:06,270
people's minds? Yes and I think the first
thing that a Wittgensteinian want to

197
00:18:06,270 --> 00:18:12,240
show the person is that effect
is occurring. I mean I don't quite know

198
00:18:12,240 --> 00:18:17,130
how to answer the question other
than to say that you know you want to

199
00:18:17,130 --> 00:18:22,320
be as sensitive as possible in
education you know normally they are we

200
00:18:22,320 --> 00:18:26,220
look at very controversial things and we
want to do that in the most sensitive

201
00:18:26,220 --> 00:18:35,010
way possible but it is definitely true
that picture it can cause great

202
00:18:35,010 --> 00:18:40,410
great emotion you know it's very can be
very very manipulative, pictures can be.

203
00:18:40,410 --> 00:18:45,240
You know, you have this you have these
things that come to your mind. Prejudice

204
00:18:45,240 --> 00:18:50,070
is a very good example of it I
mean think of what pictures

205
00:18:50,070 --> 00:18:57,660
are in the mind of someone who might be

you know a prejudice individual and so

206
00:18:57,660 --> 00:19:05,310
you know stereotypes and what people what you imagine for people this is

207
00:19:05,310 --> 00:19:10,950
quite it's quite a difficult thing it's
quite a difficult thing pictures can be

208
00:19:10,950 --> 00:19:17,370
and very very very harmful and this is
why I ultimately think that the way to

209
00:19:17,370 --> 00:19:22,920
make someone smarter is not so much to
get them to have control over their

210
00:19:22,920 --> 00:19:27,730
emotions,
but to get them to have greater curatorial

211
00:19:27,730 --> 00:19:33,899
capacity. Greater ways of imagining

things. Greater ways of seeing things and

212
00:19:33,899 --> 00:19:38,940
you know Richard Rorty talks about
sensitivity training to teach people

213
00:19:38,940 --> 00:19:43,419
first-person experiences. What is it like
to walk in this person's shoes? How does

214
00:19:43,419 --> 00:19:48,970
this person you know see life? And really
what I'm trying to argue for is being

215
00:19:48,970 --> 00:19:54,070
well-rounded and seeing other ways of
seeing a subject and I think it's kind

216
00:19:54,070 --> 00:19:57,370
of getting difficult to do in the age
that we live in, because I think we're

217
00:19:57,370 --> 00:20:03,129

reaching a point where we don't want how
we see things messed with and I think

218
00:20:03,129 --> 00:20:08,110
that's I think it's very important in
education that we make that commitment

219
00:20:08,110 --> 00:20:12,850
that you may not like this picture or way of
seeing it but I'm going to

220
00:20:12,850 --> 00:20:20,279
show this to you you know it's very
important to let me do that.

221
00:20:35,620 --> 00:20:37,680
Thank you.

